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is submitted that the Curry court strayed from its fundamentally
correct premise. After concluding that the contributory negligence
approach controls when the plaintiff's nonuse of an available
seatbelt causes the accident,217 the court added that, if the jury
determines that the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent in
failing to wear a seatbelt, the avoidable consequences approach of
Spier must then be applied in order to reduce the plaintiff's recov-
ery.218 As the Spier Court itself recognized, however, its decision is
not applicable to the situation in which the plaintiff's nonuse of an
available seatbelt causes the accident.1 In such cases, it is submit-
ted, the contributory negligence approach alone is applicable. The
troublesome aspect of the Curry decision is that although the court
rationally concluded that contributory negligence, rather than
avoidable consequences, is the correct approach when failure to use
a seatbelt causes the accident, its holding seems to permit the jury
to consider both.
Craig Noble Touma
Tape recording made by criminal suspect prior to suicide attempt
and delivered to attorney is privileged
Private papers obtained by an attorney in the course of the
attorney-client relationship220 will be protected from discovery if
217 89 App. Div. 2d at 8, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
218 Id. at 9, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 316. The court declared that "[iln the event the jury deter-
mines that plaintiff's failure to wear a seatbelt did not constitute contributory negligence
.... then under the general rule in Spier such conduct may still be considered in mitiga-
tion of damages." Id.
219 35 N.Y.2d at 451 n.3, 323 N.E.2d at 168 n.3, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 921 n.3; see supra note
192.
220 New York has codified the attorney-client privilege at section 4503(a) of the Civil
Practice Law and Rules, which provides:
Unless the client waives the privilege, an attorney or his employee, or any person
who obtains without the knowledge of the client evidence of a confidential com-
munication made between the attorney or his employee and the client in the
course of professional employment, shall not disclose, or be allowed to disclose
such communication. . ..
CPLR 4503(a) (1963). At common law, an attorney could not disclose communications made
to him in the course of his professional employment without his client's consent. 2 E. CoN-
RAD, MODERN TRuIL EVIDENCE § 1082, at 257 (1956). This rule was intended to promote
confidence and the free flow of information between a lawyer and his client so that legal
problems would be more thoroughly analyzed and justice more effectively administered. See
id.; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 163, § 87, at 175-76. The privilege afforded by section
4503(a) of the CPLR extends only to revelations made for the purpose of seeking a lawyer's
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they would have been privileged had they remained in the client's
possession . 2 1 The fifth amendment supplies one such privilege
through its prohibition against compelled testimonial self-incrimi-
nation.222 The United States Supreme Court has kept narrow the
scope of fifth amendment protection,223 however, by refusing to
professional advice. In re Jacqueline F., 47 N.Y.2d 215, 219, 391 N.E.2d 967, 970, 417
N.Y.S.2d 884, 887 (1979). In order to meet this requirement, the holder of the privilege must
be, or seek to become, a client, and the communication must be made to an attorney in his
capacity as a lawyer; the communication must relate to a fact that the attorney was in-
formed of by his client outside the presence of strangers, for the purpose of securing some
legal assistance; the communication cannot be made for the purpose of committing a crime
or tort, and the privilege must be claimed or is deemed waived. See United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950). See generally 8 J. WiOMoRE,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 2290-2329 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
221 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 404-05 (1976); 2 E. CONRAD, MODERN TRIAL
EVIDENCE § 1085, at 261 (1956). "Documents which come into existence as confidential com-
munications between attorney and client are privileged." Id. Documents that existed prior
to the inception of the attorney-client relationship, however, are not privileged unless they
were privileged in the hands of the client and were transferred to the attorney under cir-
cumstances giving rise to the attorney-client privilege. 425 U.S. at 404-05; 8 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 220, § 2307, at 592. A more rigorous rule would discourage a client from affording
his attorney access to documents and tangible objects essential to obtaining the informed
advice of counsel. 425 U.S. at 404. See generally Note, The Attorney and His Client's Privi-
leges, 74 YALE L.J. 539, 539-52 (1965).
222 The federal Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall. . . be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself. . . " U.S. CONST. amend. V. In early colonial
America, the privilege against self-incrimination prohibited the physical, or moral, compul-
sion of damaging evidence from a person's own lips. Pittman, The Colonial and Constitu-
tional History of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763,
775-79 (1935); see 8 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2263, at 362-63 (3d ed. 1940). The concerns underlying the
privilege were expounded in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964):
It reflects many of our fundamental values and noble aspirations: our unwilling-
ness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation,
perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisito-
rial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be
elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses ... and our realization that the privi-
lege, while sometimes "a shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection to the
innocent."
Id. at 55 (Goldberg, J.) (quoting Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162 (1955)).
A literal reading of the fifth amendment suggests that its sole application is to testi-
mony sought from criminal defendants. The privilege, however, has evolved to include the
testimony of a witness as well as that of the accused, Jolis v. Jolis, 142 N.Y.S.2d 309, 310
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1955), and has been applied in civil cases, Haftel v. Appleton, 42
Misc. 2d 292, 296, 247 N.Y.S.2d 967, 971 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1964), hearings and investi-
gations by a grand jury, People v. Doe, 156 Misc. 304, 306, 280 N.Y.S. 508, 510 (N.Y.C. Gen.
Sess. N.Y. County 1935), and numerous other types of hearings and investigations, see E.
FISCH, supra note 163, § 686, at 387.
22s See infra notes 224 & 262 and accompanying text.
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shield evidence that is nontestimonial in nature. 24 Recently, in In
re Bronx County Grand Jury Investigation225 (Vanderbilt), the
Court of Appeals held that a tape recording made by a criminal
suspect prior to attempting suicide qualified as testimonial in na-
ture for fifth amendment purposes and, consequently, the suspect's
lawyer could not be compelled to surrender the tape to a grand
jury.226
On January 3, 1982, Dr. Richard Rosen, a suspect in the inves-
tigation of an assault upon Clara Vanderbilt,227 unsuccessfully at-
tempted suicide.2 While he was hospitalized, his wife found in
their home, a cassette tape [tape 1] addressed to herself. 229 The
surgical supervisor who worked with Dr. Rosen discovered a second
tape [tape 2] in Dr. Rosen's desk.2 30 Dr. Rosen's superior delivered
tape 2 to Mrs. Rosen at her request,231 whereupon she wrapped
224 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 399 (1976); Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 761 (1966); People v. Green, 83 Misc. 2d 583, 592, 371 N.Y.S.2d 271, 281 (N.Y.C.
Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1975). See generally 2 E. CONRAD, supra note 220, § 1111; E. FiSCH,
supra note 163, § 692, at 392-93; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 163, § 124, at 265; 8 J. WIG-
MORE, supra note 222, § 2263, at 363. On several occasions, the Supreme Court has ad-
dressed the question of whether certain compelled evidence is testimonial in nature. The
leading case in this area is Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910), wherein the Court
held that an accused's fifth amendment rights were not implicated by compelling him to
don a blouse. Id. at 252-53. The Holt Court reasoned that the fifth amendment did not bar
admission of the accused's own body as material evidence. Id. Similarly, in Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the Court held that taking a blood sample over the peti-
tioner's objection did not violate the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 761. Justice
Brennan reasoned that the privilege bars testimonial evidence only, not noncommunicative
real or physical evidence. Id. at 764. Significantly, Schmerber has been extended to exclude
various attributes of a suspect from fifth amendment protection. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Califor-
nia, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967) (voice exemplars); District Attorney v. Angelo, 48 App. Div.
2d 576, 579, 371 N.Y.S.2d 127, 130 (2d Dep't 1975) (handwriting exemplars); accord People
v. Sallow, 100 Misc. 447, 464, 165 N.Y.S. 915, 924 (N.Y.C. Gen. Sess. N.Y. County 1917)
(fingerprints).
225 57 N.Y.2d 66, 439 N.E.2d 378, 453 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1982).
228 Id. at 70, 439 N.E.2d at 380, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
227 Id. On New Year's Eve, 1981, Clara Vanderbilt told a friend that Dr. Rosen had
asked her to meet him at his hospital office. Id. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Vanderbilt was
discovered outside Rosen's office, unconscious from a severe beating about the head. Id.
Emergency medical attention prevented her death. Id.
228 Id. By the morning of January 3, 1982, Dr. Rosen was aware that he was a suspect in
the assault investigation. Id. After learning that Ms. Vanderbilt was expected to live, Dr.
Rosen went to his office where he made a tape recording. Id. Later that evening, Rosen
attempted to commit suicide in his home, but emergency treatment saved his life. Id.
229 Id. at 71, 439 N.E.2d at 380-81, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 665. Although she did not listen to
the recording, Mrs. Rosen spoke to Arthur Olick, a friend and an attorney, who advised her
to ascertain whether her husband had left any other tapes. Id.
230 Id. Dr. Rosen's superior searched Dr. Rosen's desk at Mrs. Rosen's request. Id.
221 Id.
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both tapes and deposited them with a friend.232 When Dr. Rosen
regained consciousness, he retained Jonathan Rosner as counsel.2 3
Mrs. Rosen then retrieved the tapes from her friend and gave them
to the attorney's son, who in turn delivered them to his father.23 4
Rosner initially refused to deliver the tapes in response to sub-
poenas duces tecum, and an ex parte court order, but, after a cita-
tion for contempt, he relinquished the tapes under seal to the New
York Supreme Court.23 5 After listening to the tapes, the trial judge
quashed the subpoenas on the grounds of irrelevance. 236 The Ap-
pellate Division, First Department, rejected the finding of irrele-
vance and reversed, holding that the marital privilege protected
tape 1,237 but that no privilege attached to tape 2.238
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling as to tape
1,23 but reversed with respect to tape 2, holding that the doctor's
fifth amendment privilege enabled his lawyer to invoke the attor-
ney-client privilege on behalf of his client against production of the
2332 Id.
33 Id.
234 Id. The sealed tapes were held by the family friend prior to being delivered to the
attorney. Id.
235 Id. at 71-72, 439 N.E.2d at 381, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 665-66. Rosner was served with two
subpoenas duces tecum to compel production of the tapes. Id. Initially, Rosner refused to
comply with either subpoena, claiming the marital, attorney-client and fifth amendment
privileges. Id.
236 Id. at 72, 439 N.E.2d at 381, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 666. In light of his finding of irrele-
vance, the trial judge did not reach the issue of privilege. Id.
237 In re Vanderbilt, 87 App. Div. 2d 528, 528, 448 N.Y.S.2d 3, 6 (1st Dep't 1982). The
appellate division concluded that the tape marked "Barbara" was intended as a confidential
communication to Mrs. Rosen, and was made in reliance upon the marital relationship. Id.
The court, however, permitted a scientific inspection of the tape for alterations in order to
ensure its integrity. Id. at 529, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 6.
338 Id. The appellate division held that tape 2 was not protected by any privilege, but it
failed to give its reasons for so ruling. Id.
239 57 N.Y.2d at 74, 439 N.E.2d at 384, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 667 (1982). The district attor-
ney argued that tape 1 was not privileged because, "as a suicide message, it was not in-
tended to be received during the marriage and was made in contemplation of destroying it."
Id. at 73, 439 N.E.2d at 382, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 666. The Court rejected this argument, stating
that "the concern is whether the statement was made because of the marital relation." Id. at
73, 439 N.E.2d at 382, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 667 (citing New York Life Ins. Co. v. Ross, 30 F.2d
80, 81 (6th Cir. 1928)). Indeed, the Court observed that the focus of a suicide note might not
be the break-up of a marriage, but rather an explanation of a suicide which was made in an
"attempt to preserve the affection that gave rise to the marriage." Id. at 74, 439 N.E.2d at
383, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 667. The Court, however, reversed the ruling of the appellate division
by extending the privilege so as to bar a scientific examination of the tape. Id. at 75, 439
N.E.2d at 384, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 667. The Court reasoned that erasures or deletions are "as
much a part of the communication's 'substance' as are the statements actually made." Id.
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tape.2 40 Chief Judge Cooke, writing for the majority,241 noted that
evidence privileged in a client's hands remains privileged if it is
given to an attorney in confidence and in order to obtain legal ad-
vice.242 The Chief Judge then stated that because no one had lis-
tened to tape 2 prior to the attorney's receipt of it, the tape's mes-
sage was confidential 243 and the attorney-client privilege attached,
provided that Mrs. Rosen was acting as her husband's agent in de-
livering the tape to the lawyer.244 Since the factual question of
whether Mrs. Rosen was acting as her husband's agent had not yet
been determined the Court remanded the case for a hearing on this
issue.24 5 Finally, the Court also held that Dr. Rosen's fifth amend-
ment shield was intact,246 since the incriminating247 tape was testi-
monial in nature24s and its compelled production implicitly would
2I Id. at 70, 439 N.E.2d at 380, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 665; see infra notes 241-48 and accom-
panying text.
241 Chief Judge Cooke was joined in the majority opinion by Judges Jones, Wachtler,
Fuchsberg and Meyer. Judge Jasen wrote a separate opinion in which he concurred in part
and dissented in part. Judge Gabrielli took no part in the decision.
2'2 57 N.Y.2d at 76, 439 N.E.2d at 384, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 669; see supra note 221 and
accompanying text.
243 57 N.Y.2d at 77, 439 N.E.2d at 384, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 669. The Court reasoned that
an attorney-client privilege attached in connection with the delivery of tape 2 to Rosner
because it was "uttered" only to the attorney for the purpose of rendering legal advice re-
garding the Vanderbilt investigation. The Court also noted that the district attorney failed
to assert that anyone had heard the tape prior to its delivery to Rosner. Id. at 77 n.4, 439
N.E.2d at 384 n.4, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 669 n.4. Finally, the Court stated that a client actually
must disclose, and not merely intend to disclose, the contents of a privileged communication
in order to lose the privilege. Id. at 77, 439 N.E.2d at 384, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 668.
244 Id. at 79-80, 439 N.E.2d at 386, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 670. The Court noted that in order
for an attorney-client privilege to arise with respect to tape 2, Rosen must have made the
communication to his lawyer. Id. Therefore, unless Mrs. Rosen delivered the tape to Rosner
on her husband's behalf, she, not her husband, would have made the communication, and
the tape's message would be unprivileged in Rosner's hands. Id.
245 Id. at 79, 439 N.E.2d at 386, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 671.
246 Id., 439 N.E.2d at 385, 453 N.Y.S. 2d at 670. In Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391
(1976), the Supreme Court indicated that in order for the fifth amendment privilege to at-
tach to documentary evidence, the act of producing the document must result in "compelled
testimonial self-incrimination." Id. at 399-400. The Vanderbilt Court found that all those
elements were present in connection with the grand jury's subpoena of tape 2. 57 N.Y.2d at
79, 439 N.E.2d at 385, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 670; see infra notes 247-49 and accompanying text.
247 The Court assumed, without explanation, that the contents of the second tape were
incriminating. 57 N.Y.2d at 78, 439 N.E.2d at 385, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 669.
248 Id. at 78-79, 439 N.E.2d at 385, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 669. The Chief Judge reasoned that
evidence is testimonial if it "exposes the witness' mental state or thought processes." Id. at
78, 439 N.E.2d at 385, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 669. The Court concluded that a tape recording is
"clearly testimonial" because it is an "aural record of the accused's communication." Id. at
79, 439 N.E.2d at 385, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 670.
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authenticate the doctor's authorship of it.249
Judge Jasen concurred with respect to tape 1,250 but concluded
that no privilege had attached to the second cassette.2 51 The dis-
sent initially rejected the majority's finding that an attorney-client
privilege attached to tape 2 based upon the attorney's receipt of it
for the purpose of giving legal advice, since it was not established
that the lawyer had ever listened to the tape.25 2 Judge Jasen also
questioned the confidentiality of the communication contained in
tape 2, which was made for Dr. Rosen's colleagues, and not for his
attorney.253 Turning to the question of whether the fifth amend-
ment privilege was applicable, the dissent compared the tape to
business records to which others have access, and which conse-
quently fall outside the ambit of fifth amendment protection.2 54 Fi-
241 Id. The act of producing a document under compulsion is testimonial or communi-
cative in that by doing so, one admits the existence and his possession of the document, and
implicitly vouches for its authenticity. See, e.g., Fisher, 425 U.S. at 412 n.12. Under Fisher,
see infra notes 262-66, in order to trigger the fifth amendment guarantee against self-in-
crimination, both the evidence sought and the act of production itself must be testimonial.
See 425 U.S. at 409-11. In New York, the Court of Appeals also has stated that, under
certain circumstances, the act of production implicitly authenticates the authorship and
contents of documentary evidence. See, e.g., People v. Copicotto, 50 N.Y.2d 222, 229, 406
N.E.2d 465, 470, 428 N.Y.S.2d 649, 654 (1980); People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 27, 150 N.E.
585, 590 (1926); accord Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served Upon John Doe, 466 F.
Supp. 325, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (production of one's own papers is tantamount to admitting
their genuineness). In Vanderbilt, Chief Judge Cooke concluded that Rosen's production of
the tape would verify its authenticity. 57 N.Y.2d at 79, 439 N.E.2d at 385, 453 N.Y.S.2d at
670. Additionally, production would vouch for the circumstances surrounding the tape's
preparation, its accuracy, and the conclusions to be drawn from it. Id. On the basis of these
indicia, the Vanderbilt Court ruled that production of the second tape would be testimonial
in nature. Id.
210 57 N.Y.2d at 80, 439 N.E.2d at 386, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 671 (Jasen, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
251 Id. (Jasen, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see infra notes 252-55 and
acompanying text.
252 57 N.Y.2d at 81, 439 N.E.2d at 387, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 671 (Jasen, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part). Judge Jasen noted that Rosner did not claim to have listened to
the second tape in order to frame any legal advice. Id. (Jasen, J., concurring in part, dissent-
ing in part). Hence, Judge Jasen stated, Rosner learned only of the tape's existence, a fact
that was not a communication of a confidential nature. Id. at 81-82, 439 N.E.2d at 387, 453
N.Y.S.2d at 671 (Jasen, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The dissent concluded
that the lawyer did nothing more than act as a "repository for potentially incriminating
evidence." Id. at 82, 439 N.E.2d at 387, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 671 (Jasen, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
253 Id. at 82-83, 439 N.E.2d at 387, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 672 (Jasen, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
254 Id. at 84, 439 N.E.2d at 387-88, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 673 (Jasen, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part). In Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974), the Supreme Court held
that business records of a partnership fall outside the purview of fifth amendment protec-
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nally, the dissent maintained, the record failed to establish that
tape 2 was either incriminating or testimonial, and the majority
therefore erred in assuming the existence of these two components
of the privilege.255
On the peculiar set of facts presented, it is submitted that the
Vanderbilt Court was correct in holding that the second tape re-
cording was protected by the attorney-client privilege. Although
the Court proceeded through its analysis in a somewhat abbrevi-
ated fashion,258 its conclusion comports with prior constructions of
the components of the attorney-client privilege.257 The finding of
confidentiality is viable because there was no evidence that anyone
listened to the tape from the time it was made until the time it
passed into the attorney's hands.258 Less easily supported is the
finding that the tape was communicated to the attorney in order to
obtain legal advice. It is submitted, however, that the attorney did,
indeed, render legal "advice," based upon the tape, by actively re-
sisting the court's demand for production of such evidence.259
tion because an individual does not have a sufficient private interest in shielding such
records. Id. at 101. Judge Jasen analogized the second tape to business records since the
tape was left for Rosen's medical colleagues, and was, therefore, not intended to be a private
record. 57 N.Y.2d at 84, 439 N.E.2d at 388, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 673 (Jasen, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
255 57 N.Y.2d at 84-85, 439 N.E.2d at 389, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 674 (Jasen, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
251 See id. at 76-77, 439 N.E.2d at 384, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 668-69.
257 See infra notes 258-59 and accompanying text.
2" See CPLR 4503(a) (1963); supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text. To invoke the
attorney-client privilege, it must be established that the communication made to an attor-
ney was confidential. CPLR 4503(a) (1963). Accordingly, communications made in the pres-
ence of third parties are not privileged. See People v. Boone, 51 App. Div. 2d 25, 379
N.Y.S.2d 181 (3d Dep't 1976). In Vanderbilt, the Court likened the tape to a letter con-
tained in a sealed envelope, stating that a sealed letter's existence becomes known to those
who hold it, but its contents and thus its communications remain undisclosed. 57 N.Y.2d at
77 n.5, 439 N.E.2d at 384 n.5, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 669 n.5.
259 See supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text. Numerous cases have observed that
the client transferred items to his attorney in order to secure legal advice. In Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), for example, the Supreme Court held that a client's
papers, which were prepared by his accountant, were delivered to the attorney for purposes
of obtaining legal advice with respect to a pending investigation by the Internal Revenue
Service. Id. at 405; see In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 632 F.2d 1033, 1042 (3d Cir. 1980)
(client transferred diary to attorney for purpose of receiving legal advice). Similarly, in In re
January 1976 Grand Jury, 534 F.2d 719, 728-29 (2d Cir. 1976), the court remarked that
when instrumentalities of a crime were given to an attorney, the client was intending to
receive legal advice. It is clear, however, that a privilege does not attach in such a situation
because fruits and instrumentalities of a crime are not privileged. See In re Ryder, 263 F.
Supp. 360, 365 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 381 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1967).
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Therefore, evidence that the attorney actually listened to the tape
does not appear to be essential, since it was not necessary to listen
to the tape to render legal advice regarding its protection. 60 A con-
trary holding seemingly would undermine the policy favoring free
disclosure between client and attorney.261
The Vanderbilt Court's resolution of the fifth amendment is-
sue is, perhaps, more troublesome. The Court reasoned that both
the tape and its production were inherently testimonial within the
meaning of Fisher v. United States.2  In Fisher, the Supreme
Court limited the then prevalent "convergence theory," under
which private papers were considered per se privileged,263 holding
that the fifth amendment shielded only compelled testimonial self-
incrimination, and not private information per se.264 The Court
reasoned that since the documents were prepared voluntarily, only
260 See supra note 221. It should be noted that the attorney had control of the tape for
less than a month before turning it over to the court. See 57 N.Y.2d at 71-72, 439 N.E.2d at
381, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 665-66. Presumably, he could have intended to listen to the tape at a
later time for the purpose of preparing a defense.
2 1 See supra note 221.
262 425 U.S. 391 (1976); see 57 N.Y.2d at 79, 439 N.E.2d at 385, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 670;
supra notes 248-49 and accompanying text.
"' See infra notes 264-66 and accompanying text. In 1886, the Supreme Court held
that compulsory production of the defendant's private papers in order to use them against
him was an unconstitutional search and seizure under the fourth amendment, and was
equivalent to compelling him to be a witness against himself. Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 633 (1886); see R. CUSHMAN, CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 311 (5th ed. 1979).
Indeed, the Boyd Court stated that
any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of his private
papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime or to forfeit his goods, is
within the condemnation of that judgment. In this regard the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments run almost into each other.
116 U.S. at 630. Subsequent to Boyd, the proposition that private papers are per se privi-
leged under the fifth amendment had been reiterated numerous times. See, e.g., Bellis v.
United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87 (1974); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 306 (1921);
Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377 (1911). The Boyd doctrine, however, had been
subject to certain limitations prior to the Fisher holding. In 1913, for example, the Supreme
Court held that a party may rely upon the fifth amendment in order to withhold self-in-
criminating evidence, but that he could not prevent a third party from producing it. John-
son v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913); see Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328
(1973) (fifth amendment privilege is a personal privilege).
264 See 425 U.S. at 401. The Court in Fisher was faced with the issue of whether an
attorney possessing records prepared by his client's accountant could be compelled to sur-
render them. In ruling that the lawyer could be compelled to release the records, the Court
stated that "the Fifth Amendment... truly serves privacy interests; but the Court has
never ... applied the Fifth Amendment to prevent the otherwise proper acquisition or use
of evidence which . . . did not involve compelled testimonial self-incrimination of some
sort." Id. at 399; see supra note 224.
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the act of production would be compelled.265 Left unanswered by
Fisher, however, was the question of whether the compelled pro-
duction of personally prepared private papers would violate the
fifth amendment privilege. 26 A broad reading of Vanderbilt appar-
ently suggests that it would, since the Court expressly stated that
the tape and its production were inherently testimonial. 2 7 The
value of the Court's decision in different factual contexts, however,
is unclear. Specifically, the decision gives no indication of whether
business or accounting notations recorded on tape also would be
deemed "testimonial," or whether they more likely would be con-
sidered business records whose only testimonial aspects flow from
the act of production. 268 It is submitted, therefore, that future de-
terminations of whether the fifth amendment privilege attaches to
tape recordings must necessarily be made on a case-by-case basis,
115 425 U.S. at 410 & n.11. The Court concluded that the order for the personal records
did not compel testimonial evidence because the materials existed prior to the issuance of
the summons, did not contain the taxpayer's testimonial declarations, and were prepared
voluntarily. Id. at 409-10. Thus, the Court noted, "the only thing compelled is the act of
producing the document. . . ." Id. at 410 n.11 (citation omitted). The Court also stated,
however, that the act of surrendering data had testimonial aspects regardless of the contents
of the documents. 425 U.S. at 410.
I'l 425 U.S. at 414. The Court expressly stated that the issue of the case was not
whether the fifth amendment would shield the taxpayer from producing his own private tax
records. Subsequent to Fisher, many courts addressed the applicability of the fifth amend-
ment to the situation in which private papers are sought from the accused. A number of
these cases, however, apparently did not interpret Fisher to effect a change in the principle
that private papers are protected. In In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 632 F.2d 1033 (3d Cir.
1980), for example, the Third Circuit held that an individual's pocket diaries were privileged
under the fifth amendment. Id. at 1042. The court's rationale was based upon the premise
that the "fifth amendment protects an accused from government-compelled disclosure of
self-incriminating private papers. . ." Id.; see In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 646 F.2d 963,
968 (5th Cir. 1981) (privilege extends to an individual's private books and records); United
States v. Beattie, 541 F.2d 329, 331 (2d Cir. 1976) (Fisher does not alter the principle that
the fifth amendment protects private papers); People v. Copicotto, 50 N.Y.2d 222, 229, 406
N.E.2d 465, 470, 428 N.Y.S.2d 649, 654 (1980) (dictum) (court could not compel production
of purely private papers); cf. Briggs v. Salcines, 392 So.2d 263, 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)
(privilege protects a person from producing private tape recordings when compelled produc-
tion would amount to forced incriminating testimonial communication).
267 57 N.Y.2d at 79, 439 N.E.2d at 386, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 670.
218 It is submitted that, although the dissent properly criticized the majority for finding
that tape 2 was "testimonial" in nature, the cases relied upon by Judge Jasen to support his
criticism are distinguishable from the Vanderbilt situation insofar as they did not involve
evidence that is communicative in nature. Indeed, the dissent cited cases, including Schmer-
ber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), that deal with purely physical evidence. Nevertheless,
with respect to tape recordings, it is suggested that courts should focus upon the question of
whether the contents of the recordings truly are testimonial. In Vanderbilt, though, the
Court ruled that the tape was testimonial by its very nature.
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with due weight given to the communicative nature of the tape's
contents.
It is further submitted that although the Court's conclusion as
to the testimonial nature of the tape is questionable, the Court's
rationale nonetheless may have precedential value with respect to
the applicability of the fifth amendment privilege to private pa-
pers. The Vanderbilt rationale seemingly would extend fifth
amendment protection to diaries, letters, and other private records
because they are inherently communicative of the author's
thoughts and ideas. Furthermore, the very production of such doc-
uments meets the Fisher testimonial standard, since their com-
pelled production verifies the documents' existence, authorship
and genuineness.269 Thus, notwithstanding the demise of per se
protection of private documents, it appears that the New York
Court of Appeals has indicated that private papers often will fall
within the purview of the fifth amendment's protection.
Donna M. Gerber
269 The Vanderbilt Court partly based its decision upon the fact that production of the
tape would be the equivalent of vouching for its genuineness, admitting its existence, and
expressing the author's belief that it was the article demanded in the subpoena. See supra
note 249 and accompanying text.
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